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and judges the contest. The topic selected for 1984 was "The Warrant Clause:
Roots, Rights and Remedies."






Argued August 10, 1991
Decided October 12, 1991
Chief Justice VERBUM delivered the
opinion of the Court.
This case arises in the aftermath of the
tragic assassination of the president of
the United States and four members of
her cabinet on July 4, 1991, during the
opening ceremonies of the Bill of Rights
Bicentennial Exposition in Philadelphia,
Pa. The petitioner has publicly allied
himself with the terrorist organization
claiming responsibility for the murders.
He acknowledged to three witnesses
that he has personal knowledge of the
assassination plot and its perpetrators.
He now challenges the validity of a war-
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rant issued by a U.S. district judge in
Philadelphia. The warrant authorizes a
duly licensed physician to attach elec-
trodes to the scalp of the petitioner to
monitor his thought patterns for a period
of 24 hours. The sophisticated use of
electrodes sensitive to electrical and
chemical activity in the human brain has
progressed to the point that mental
images produced by recall can now be
externally reproduced and recorded. See
Strangelove, "Image Transduction by
Ultraradiant Electroencephalograph,"
266 Science 363 (1989).
The warrant does not require the peti-
tioner to cooperate in any way. He has
been given a grant of immunity preclud-
ing the use against him of any testimony
he presents to the special grand jury
investigating the presidential assassina-
tion. He is already confined for con-
tempt of court in refusing to testify
under that grant of immunity. The addi-
tional restraint necessary to execute this
warrant is thus inconsequential. Nor will
the petitioner be subjected to any form
of interrogation. The extraction of brain
images requires the total absence of
external stimuli. The device will simply
reproduce the images created by the
petitioner's self-induced recall for a 24-
hour period. The order requires the phy-
sician executing it to record only those
images which are related to the inquiry
being conducted, and specifies a list of
other suspects for this purpose.
No infringement of any protection
afforded by the Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege against self-incrimination is
involved here. We have long since lim-
ited the reach of that clause to compelled
communication, not disclosure of private
information. Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976). Here, just as in
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463,
473-74 (1976), "petitioner was not asked
to say or do anything," and "the individ-
ual against whom the search is directed
is not required to aid in the discovery,
production, or authentication of incrim-
inating evidence." In any event, the dis-
trict judge obviated any Fifth Amend-
ment concerns in this case by ruling that
the previous grant of use immunity will
extend to any information gained by the
execution of this warrant.
Illustrations by Gary Gianni
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The only issue raised by these pro-
ceedings is whether an individual's inter-
est in the privacy of his thoughts is to be
elevated to total immunity from govern-
mental intrusion. The petitioner suggests
that such protection is compelled by the
Fourth Amendment prohibition of
"unreasonable" searches and seizures.
The government responds that this
search is justified under the Fourth
Amendment warrant clause, since there
is ample showing of probable cause that
evidence of a crime will be discovered,
and the warrant describes the evidence
to be seized with all the particularity
possible under the circumstances. While
the petitioner offers apocalyptic visions
drawn from the futuristic novels read by
every college sophomore a generation
ago, he can offer no controlling prece-
dent to justify a holding that any expec-
tation of privacy is totally immune from
governmental intrusion under the Fourth
Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits
only "unreasonable" searches, and the
only time this Court has even found any
search conducted in compliance with the
warrant clause's requirements of proba-
ble cause and particularity to be unrea-
sonable was in Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298 (1921), and its progeny.
There the seizure of papers from a sus-
pect pursuant to a warrant was invali-
dated because the government had no
proprietary interest in the papers apart
from their evidentiary value. This "mere
evidence" rule, which precluded the
issuance of a search warrant for any
items other than fruits and instrumen-
talities of a crime or contraband, was
overruled by this Court in Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), and we
have no interest in resuscitating its dis-
credited doctrine. Significantly, the
Gouled rule was clearly premised on
concepts of the protection of property
interests, not privacy. 255 U.S. at 309.
Moreover, the Gouled Court specifically
recognized that a search pursuant to a
valid warrant could not be unreasonable:
"... searches and seizures made under
[warrants] are to be regarded as not
unreasonable, and therefore not pro-
hibited by the amendment. Searches and
seizures are as constitutional under the
amendment when made under valid
search warrants as they are unconstitu-
tional, because unreasonable, when
made without them-the permission of
the amendment has the same constitu-
tional warrant as the prohibition has, and
the definition of the former restrains the
scope of the latter." 255 U.S. at 308.
The warrant issued here, to permit the
88 American Bar Association Journal
seizure of petitioner's thoughts, meets
all of the constitutional requisites for a
valid warrant. Probable cause is prac-
tically conceded. The particularity of the
description of the evidence to be seized
is no less detailed than that contained in
wiretap warrants we have upheld for the
interception and seizure of telephone
conversations. Scott v. United States,
436 U.S. 128 (1978). The intrusion per-
mitted here closely parallels the seizure
of oral communications allowed by wire-
tapping and eavesdropping warrants.
The words being seized in that context
are simply the physical embodiment of
thoughts in a different form. The fact
that their seizure here requires a pain-
less process of extraction from the brain
is of no constitutional significance.
The petitioner urges an analogy to a
case in which the Fourth Amendment
was held to preclude surgical removal of
a bullet from the defendant's body. Lee
v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1983).
That decision did not accord absolute





the brain is of no
constitutional
significance.
to the body of the accused, however.
The court emphasized the physical risks
of general anesthesia, rather than the
threat to any privacy interest of the
accused, in holding that the surgery pro-
posed there would be an unreasonable
search. The intrusion proposed here
more closely resembles the extraction of
blood from a suspect's gastrointestinal
tract. These procedures have been per-
mitted pursuant to warrants based on a
"clear indication" that evidence would
be uncovered. Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966); United States v.
Couch, 688 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1982).
The petitioner also suggests that
uncommunicated human thoughts
should be accorded absolute protection
for "freedom of thought" under the First
Amendment. The First Amendment,
however, is not designed to protect
"freedom of thought," but freedom to
communicate. As Justice White
observed in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 576 (1974), "freedom from cen-
sorship is not equivalent to freedom
from inspection or perusal." The war-
rant issued here impinges the latter, not
the former. Even if First Amendment
interests were at stake, that would not
elevate the petitioner's thoughts to abso-
lute immunity from search. As this
Court noted in Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978), "the
prior cases do no more than insist that
the courts apply the warrant require-
ments with particular exactitude when
First Amendment interests would be en-
dangered by the search."
Finally, the petitioner compares
uncommunicated thoughts to the mus-
ings of a private diary, suggesting that
personal diaries are immune from sei-
zure under the Fourth Amendment. We
know of no case recognizing such immu-
nity. To the contrary, courts have consis-
tently permitted the seizure and use in
evidence of private diaries, when a suffi-
cient nexus to criminal activity has been
established. DiGuiseppe v. Ward, 698
F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1983); California v.
Miller, 131 Cal.Rptr. 863 (1976). We are
not unsympathetic to the suggestion of
commentators that private papers are
entitled to greater Fourth Amendment
protection than ordinary evidence. See
McKenna, "The Constitutional Protec-
tion of Private Papers: The Role of a
Hierarchical Fourth Amendment," 53
Indiana Law Journal 55 (1978). Perhaps
uncommunicated thoughts should be
placed at the pinnacle of such a hier-
archy. But nothing within the Fourth
Amendment supports protection which
is absolute. Commentators have also
suggested that the gravity of the offense
is a relevant consideration in determin-
ing whether a particular governmental
intrusion is acceptable. "Surely there is
a valid distinction between society's
interest in obtaining evidence relating to
a conspiracy to assassinate the president
of the United States and its interest in
obtaining evidence concerning a simple
trespass." Comment, "The Search and
Seizure of Private Papers: Fourth and
Fifth Amendment Considerations," 6
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 274,
304-05 (1973). We can leave for another
day the question of whether a showing
of ordinary probable cause of an ordi-
nary offense would justify the extraordi-
nary intrusion permitted by this warrant.
In this case, we have no difficulty con-
cluding that the warrant is valid, and
therefore, the search it permits is rea-
sonable.
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Justice VERITAS, dissenting:
Even in the frightening world of
"Thought Police" conjured by George
Orwell, "With all their cleverness, they
had never mastered the secret of finding
out what another human being was
thinking." Orwell, 1984, page 138 (New
American Library, 1983). That secret has
now been mastered, and this Court is
finally presented with the profound
question predicted by Justice Brandeis
in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 474 (1928): "Advances in the psy-
chic and related sciences may bring
means of exploring unexpressed beliefs,
thoughts and emotions. . . . To Lord
Camden a far slighter intrusion seemed
'subversive of all the comforts of
society.' Can it be that the Constitution
affords no protection against such invas-
ions of individual security?" The major-
ity finds a "relative" answer for that
question in the "warrant clause" of the
Fourth Amendment: such invasions of
personal security must be "balanced"
against the need for the security of the
state. I believe the "reasonableness
clause" of the Fourth Amendment
provides an absolute answer: the invas-
ion of personal security which the war-
rant in this case authorizes is
unreasonable per se. If we truly seek the
meaning the Fourth Amendment must
have in the "brave new world" of 21st
century America, we will find it in the
precedents of the 17th, 18th and 19th
centuries, not in those of the past 25
years. What Justice Brennan said of the
Fifth Amendment is equally true of the
Fourth: "History and principle, not the
mechanical application of its wording,
have been the life of the amendment."
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 417
(Brennan, J., concurring).
The history of the common law
reveals a consistent struggle to create
some impenetrable barriers to govern-
mental intrusion, to protect the privacy
even of thought which might be deemed
a threat to the security of the state.
In 1683 Algernon Sidney was con-
demned to death for treason, for daring
to write that kings who break their trust
may be called to account by the people
through their Parliament. The papers in
which this writing appeared had been
seized from Sidney's bedroom pursuant
to a warrant. In pleading his own case
before Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys, who
later achieved infamy for the "Bloody
Assizes," Algernon Sidney raised the
same objection to that warrant which is
raised by the petitioner in this case.
Col. Sidney, "Then, my Lord, I think
'tis a Right of Mankind, and 'tis exer-
cised by all studious men, that they
write in their own Closets what they
please for their Memory, and no man can




Lord Chief Justice, "Pray don't go
away with that right of mankind, that it
is lawful for me to write what I will in
my own Closet, unless I publish it; I
have been told, Curse not the King, not
in thy thoughts, not in thy Bed-Cham-
ber, the Birds of the air will carry it. I
took it to be the duty of mankind to
observe that."
Col. Sidney, "I have lived under the
Inquisition .. "
Lord Chief Justice, "God be thanked,
we are governed by Law."
Col. Sidney, "I have lived under the
Inquisition, and there is no man in Spain
can be tryed for Heresie ... "
Mr. Justice Withins, "Draw no Presi-
dents from the Inquisition here, I
beseech you Sir."
Lord Chief Justice, "We must not
endure men to talk, that by the right of
nature, every man may contrive mischief
in his own Chamber, and he is not to be
punished, till he thinks fit to be called to
it."
(The Arraignment, Tryal & Con-
demnation of Algernon Sidney, Esq.,
pages 34-35, London, 1684).
Fifteen years after Sidney was drawn
upon a hurdle to Tyburn Hill to be
hanged, drawn, quartered and beheaded,
his "treasonous" papers were published
as Discourses Concerning Government,
a treatise which inspired the American
colonists who led a revolution against
another English king a century later.
The American colonists also drew
inspiration from the prosecution of
another English dissenter whose case,
80 years later, ended more happily. On
April 22, 1763, a newspaper called The
North Briton appeared on the streets of
London, labeling the King's ministers
"tools of despotism and corruption" and
accusing King George III himself of
complicity in dishonest negotiations for
the recently concluded Treaty of Paris.
The secretary issued a warrant com-
manding four officers: "to make strick
and diligent search for the authors,
printers and publishers of a seditious
and treasonable paper entitled the North
Briton Numb. 45, Saturday, April 22,
1763, printed for G. Kearsly in Ludgate-
Street, London, and them, or any of
them having found, to apprehend or
seize together with their papers, and to
bring in safe custody before me, to be
examined concerning the premises and
further dealt with according to law."
In execution of this warrant, houses
were entered, blacksmiths were called in
to break open locked bureaus, pa ,ers
were seized, and nearly 50 suspects
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In 1683 Algernon Sidney was
condemned to death for treason for
daring to write that kings who break
their trust may be called to account by
the people.
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were rounded up. Among them was
John Wilkes, a rakish member of Parlia-
ment who used his prosecution to rally
opposition to the government. Wilkes'
prosecutor was the earl of Sandwich,
later immortalized for lending his
appellation to both Hawaii and ham on
rye. Sandwich taunted Wilkes, saying he
would die "either of the pox or on the
gallows." Wilkes responded, "That
depends, my lord, whether I embrace
your mistress or your principles." After
gaining his release on a claim of parlia-
mentary privilege, Wilkes brought suit
against the secretary of state for tres-
pass. The government spared no
expense in defending its action, spend-
ing the enormous sum of £ 100,000 on its
legal defense. Wilkes won a judgment of
£4,000 when the warrant was declared
invalid because none of the suspects was
named. Wilkes became London's idol,
and its lord mayor as well.
Soon after the decision in Wilkes'
case, the English courts were presented
with the case of another political pam-
phleteer, John Entick. Entick had been
named in the warrant under which his
papers were seized, though. Thus, the
question of the validity of any warrant
purporting to justify the seizure of pri-
vate papers was directly presented. The
answer, provided by Lord Chief Justice
Camden, was a resounding restatement
of the sentiments expressed by Algernon
Sidney a century before: "If this point
should be determined in favor of juris-
diction, the secret cabinets and bureaus
of every subject in this kingdom will be
thrown open to the search and inspec-
tion of a messenger, whenever the secre-
tary of state shall see fit to charge, or
even to suspect, a person to be the
author, printer or publisher of a sedi-
tious libel.... To enter a man's house,
by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order
to procure evidence, is worse than the
Spanish Inquisition-a law under which
no Englishman would wish to live an
hour." Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.
State Tr. 1030.
Wilkes' cause was also championed in
Parliament by William Pitt, a boyhood
friend of Lord Chief Justice Camden.
The parliamentary debate produced
Pitt's eloquent and oft-quoted defense of
the constitutional right of privacy: "The
poorest man may, in his cottage, bid
defiance to all the forces of the Crown.
It may be frail, its roof may shake; the
wind may blow through it; the storm
may enter; the rain may enter; but the
king of England may not enter; all his
force dares not cross the threshold of
the mined tenement."
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These events were widely reported in
the American colonies and achieved tre-
mendous symbolic importance. Wilkes,
Pitt and Lord Camden, who later served
as lord chancellor, were among the loud-
est critics of the colonial policies which
led to the American Revolution. Their
heroism was memorialized in the names
of colonial cities and towns. Camden,
N.J., Pittsburgh, Pa., and Wilkes-Barre,
Pa., are modern reminders of this coura-
geous trio. Their attacks on the use of
warrants to seize private papers were
remembered when the former colonists
fashioned a Bill of Rights. Those who
drafted the Fourth Amendment in 1791
"... vibrated in sympathy with the new
libertarian trends in England. Colonial
lawyers would naturally turn to the
speeches of Pitt and the opinions of
Mansfield and Camden-especially of
the latter, whose pro-colonial speeches
had won him high place in the hearts of
American patriots-for eloquent exposi-
tion of English liberties and weighty
examination of the common law of
searches and warrants." T. Taylor, Two
Studies in Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, page 38 (1969).
Thomas Jefferson kept a complete set
of the "State Trials" in his personal
library, so he was well-acquainted with
the proceedings against Sydney, Wilkes
and Entick. Catalogue of the Library of
Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 5, page 296.
This history breathes life into the com-
mand of the Fourth Amendment that
"the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated." As the
majority reads these words, they add
absolutely nothing to the warrant clause.
They can only serve to detract from the
warrant clause, by allowing warrantless
searches which are "reasonable." Yet
the history of the Fourth Amendment
convincingly demonstrates that the "rea-
sonableness clause" was added because
the warrant clause alone was deemed
insufficient protection against the exces-
ses of governmental intrusion. Lasson,
The History and Development of the
Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, page 103 (1937);
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 316-17
(1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
When the question whether thW-
Fourth Amendment erected any abso-
lute barriers to governmental intrusion
was finally presented to this Court, the
justices quite naturally looked to
"events which took place in England"
and were "fresh in the memory of those
who achieved our independence" to
ascertain the meaning of the terms
"unreasonable searches and seizures."
In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
530 (1885), Mr. Justice Bradley quoted
Lord Camden's opinion in Entick v. Car-
rington at great length, then summed up
its meaning in words which once again
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echoed the "right of mankind" asserted
by Algernon Sidney: "The principles
laid down in the opinion affect the very
essence of constitutional liberty and
security. They reach farther than the
concrete form of the case then before
the court, with its adventitious circum-
stances; they apply to all invasions, on
the part of the government and its
employees, of the sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life. It is not
the breaking of his doors and the rum-
maging of his drawers that constitutes
the essence of the offense; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of per-
sonal security, personal liberty and pri-
vate property, where that right has never
been forfeited by his conviction of some
public offense; it is the invasion of this
sacred right which underlies and con-
stitutes the essence of Lord Camden's
judgment. Breaking into a house and
opening boxes and drawers are circum-
stances of aggravation; but any forcible
and compulsory extortion of a man's
own testimony or of his private papers
to be used as evidence to convict him of
crime or to forfeit his goods is within the
condemnation of that judgment. In this
regard, the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments run almost into each other."
Justice Bradley's opinion was praised
as a landmark to be remembered "as
long as civil liberty lives in the United
States," (Brandeis, J., dissenting in
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 474 (1928)), and condemned as
"dangerous heresy" and "radical fal-
lacy." (8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2264 (3d
ed. 1940).) The barrier he erected was
much too broad and has since been
largely dismantled. Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 407-09 (1976). But
the basic principle he espoused was an
accurate reflection of one of the highest
aspirations of the common law: to pro-
tect a private inner sanctum of individual
feeling and thought which cannot be
penetrated by the government.
What is at stake in this case is the last
remnant of that barrier, a sanctuary
"where the law can never reach." War-
den v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 321 (1967)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Its preserva-
tion does not require the resuscitation of
Boyd's discredited "mere evidence"
doctrine, which required the govern-
ment to establish a "property" interest in
the items to be seized under a warrant.
In discarding this doctrine in 1967, we
left open the question whether the very
nature of "testimonial" or "commu-
nicative" evidence may preclude it from
being the object of a reasonable search
and seizure.
The majority concludes Ihat ilie quc-
tion reserved in Warden v. iIaden %%a
answered in Andresen v. Marvland. 427
U.S. 463 (1976), when we rejected an
argument that seizure of business rec-
ords from the defendant's offices could
be opposed on self-incrimination
grounds. Andresen addressed Fifth
Amendment concerns which are not rel-
evant here. What is objectionable with
the warrant in this case is not that the
petitioner is being compelled to divulge
his thoughts. What is objectionable is
the government's intrusion into those
thoughts at all, even with a warrant.
Once we abandoned any role for the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination as an absolute protection-of
privacy interests, Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391 at 401 (1976), we
were left with the "reasonableness"
clause of the Fourth Amendment as the
only means of defining the limits of gov-
ernmental intrusiveness. The majority
has now eschewed any independent sig-
nificance for that clause, in effect hold-
ing that all searches conducted pursuant
to a valid warrant are, ipso facto, rea-
sonable. That relegates the privacy of
our thoughts to "relative" protection,
depending upon how convincing the
governmental need for the intrusion
might be.
By purporting to "balance" the inter-
est of the individual in the privacy of his
thoughts against the interest of the state
in effective law enforcement, the major-
ity has stacked the scales. How can the
intangible benefits of untrammeled
thought, even thought which contem-
plates the destruction of society, be mea-
sured against the concrete cost imposed
by the escape of those who have struck
a mortal blow against the fabric of our
society? While the majority purports to
limit the breadth of their holding by the
prospect that the balance may be struck
in favor of the privacy of individual
thought in future cases, with less
egregious facts, history offers little rea-
son to hope that this prospect will ever
be borne out. Only the recognition of a
sphere of absolute protection under the
Fourth Amendment will give recognition
V
"Curse not the King, not in thy
thoughts, not in thy Bed-Chamber,
the Birds of the air will carry it."
to the absolute value we ascribe to pri-
vacy of thought.
The cases in which the government
seeks to intrude into this sphere will
always be "hard" cases. The case of
Algernon Sidney was a "hard" case. So
were the cases of John Wilkes and John
Entick. A willingness to pay the price of
"hard" cases will not be apparent, "...
so long as Fourth Amendment holdings
must find justification in their ability to
maximize protection of the 'innocent' at
a minimum 'cost' to society. Hopefully,
the demarcation of a sphere of absolute
privilege as of right under the Fourth
and Fifth amendments will, by redirect-
ing attention to the human rights of the
accused, support efforts to provide
greater protection for the similar values
at stake in the non-privileged area."
Note, "Formalism, Legal Realism, and
Constitutionally Protected Privacy under
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments." 90
Harv. L. Rev. 945, 991 (1977).
Right now, the "balancing scale" of
Fourth Amendment protection remains
at sea, with no anchor. There is literally
no extreme beyond which governmental
intrusion is absolutely forbidden. With
the privacy of human thought left to the
warrant clause of the Fourth Amend-
ment for protection, we have come full
circle in our Fourth Amendment odys-
sey, back to the position espoused by
Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys in the trial of
Algernon Sidney over three centuries
ago, "Curse not the King, not in thy
thoughts, not in thy Bed-Chamber, the
Birds of the air will carry it."
(Gerald F Uelmen is a professor at
Loyola Law School in Los Angeles,
where he was associate dean from
1973-75.)
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